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RECKONING WITH KANT ON RACE*
ELVIRA BASEVICH
This essay develops Kant’s theory of reform to theorize racial justice reform. 
I assess the function of Kant’s philosophy of race as part of his nonideal the-
ory of justice, which offers a racist pragmatic anthropology that uses the con-
cept of race to determine the practical effectiveness of legislative reason. His 
philosophy of race defends a teleological account of the natural history of the 
human species to fulfill the requirements of justice and assumes that certain 
racial groups have failed to develop their innate capacity for legislative rea-
son. I show that we need an alternative Kantian nonideal theory of justice that 
demonstrates how legislative reason actualizes practical freedom. Rather than 
appeal to anthropology, I expand Kant’s model of public reason to advance 
racial justice reform under the conditions of partial compliance to the require-
ments of justice in a profoundly nonideal republic such as the U.S. I then show-
case the promise—and limits—of the a priori ideals of citizenship and publicity 
for racial justice reform and introduce the new ideal of interracial civic fellow-
ship to guide the public use of reason in nonideal circumstances.
*Many thanks to Pauline Kleingeld for extensive and generous comments on a previous draft of this 
paper. I am also grateful to the editor Douglas P. Lackey, an anonymous reviewer, Marzouq Alnusf, 
Larry Blum, Kyla Ebels Duggan, Adam Hosein, Frank Kirkland, Charles Mills, Andreja Novakovic, 
William Paris, Clinton Tolley, Helga Varden, Alice Pinheiro Walla, Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović, 
and Christopher Yeomans for instructive comments. An early draft was workshopped at a research 
working group organized by Isaac Ariail Reed and Michael Weinman at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia. I am also indebted to audiences at the University of 
Oslo, Purdue University, Northwestern University, and the North American Kant Society confer-
ence at Brandeis University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of the growing interest in the topic of Kant and race, few commentators 
have explored the function of Kant’s philosophy of race as part of his nonideal 
theory of justice. Kant’s pragmatic anthropology examines the practical efficacy 
of legislative reason under the conditions of partial compliance to the require-
ments of justice. The object of his anthropology is not what nature makes of 
human beings, but “what […] a free acting being makes or can and should make 
of themselves.”1 His pragmatic anthropology uses the concept of race to illustrate 
the human species’ potential for achieving a civil condition, that is, a coercive 
system of equal freedom under law or public right governed by the universal prin-
ciples of justice (or right). Kant defends a teleological view of history, the final 
end of which is the establishment of constitutional republics. While all persons 
have an innate capacity for legislative reason, he holds that some racial groups 
have failed to develop it fully. According to Kant, a natural history of the human 
species showcases an apparent indisposition of nonwhite racial groups to express 
an innate capacity for legislative reason to advance a “law-governed social order.”2 
His racist pragmatic anthropology assumes that, in part, the problem of partial 
compliance reflects an indisposition among people of color to enter a civil condi-
tion and to advance the final end of history.
Many commentators have aimed to severe Kant’s comments on race from his 
moral and political philosophy.3 There are two dominant lines of defense: (1) 
Kant’s ideal theory (e.g., the universal principles and concepts of his moral and 
political philosophy) “contradicts” elements of his nonideal theory of justice, es-
pecially his philosophy of race and (2) Kant abandons his racial hierarchy in his 
mature writings of the 1790s to grant full juridical status to all persons, explicitly 
condemning slavery and colonialism. Line (2) logically entails (1). For example, 
Pauline Kleingeld argues that in the mid-1790s Kant discerns the contradiction 
between his moral universalism and his racist views.4 He, then, grants all persons 
 1 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006) 3.
 2 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Kant: Political 
Writings (New York: Cambridge UP, 1991) 41–53, 44–45.
 3 For example, Lucy Allais, “Kant’s Racism,” Philosophical Papers 45 no. 1–2 (2016): 1–36; Thomas 
Hill and Boxill Bernard, “Kant and Race,” Race and Racism, ed. Bernard Boxill (New York: Oxford 
UP, 2001) 448–71; Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human 
Beings (New York: Oxford UP, 2000).
 4 Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,” The Philosophical Quarterly 57 no. 229 
(2007): 573–92; Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism,” Kant and 
Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives, ed. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2014) 43–67; Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal 
of World Citizenship (New York: Cambridge UP, 2013) ch. 3.
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full juridical standing in a cosmopolitan condition in his mature political 
philosophy.
In this essay, I develop a new interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of race. I 
focus on the role that Kant assigns race in his pragmatic anthropology and 
argue that his philosophy of race attempts to illustrate partial compliance to the 
requirements of justice.5 His racist pragmatic anthropology is, therefore, part 
of his nonideal theory of justice. Given his offensive and implausible assess-
ment of race, we need an alternative nonideal theory of justice that models how 
legislative reason becomes practically effective in a nonideal public sphere. 
Kant blames people of color for a cultural “backwardness” as the cause of their 
exclusion from domestic and cosmopolitan right. In contrast, a viable theory of 
racial justice reform should target the habits of citizenship among dominant 
racial groups that legitimate racially exclusionary laws and public policies in a 
nonideal public sphere.6 Unsurprisingly, Kant does not theorize how a 
white-controlled polity tends to condone and legitimate racial exclusion in a 
multiracial polity, which is precisely what a viable theory of racial justice re-
form requires, at least in the U.S. To be sure, Kant did not even posit the task 
of building a just interracial polity; and so, his conception of reform omits the 
civic virtues necessary for advancing racial justice in the context of interracial 
civic fellows sharing a republican constitutional state. It is therefore necessary 
to rethink his conception of public reason as a tool for racial justice reform.
In sum, I expand Kant’s mature theory of reform from the 1790s, which in-
cludes the “pure” ideals of a just state (Rechtsstaat), publicity, and citizenship, 
with the “impure” ideal of interracial civic fellowship to guide racial justice 
 5 My approach complements Todd Hedrick’s excellent essay, “Race, Difference, and Anthropology 
in Kant’s Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 no. 2 (2008): 245–68. See also 
Mark Larrimore, “Antinomies of Race: Diversity and Destiny in Kant,” Patterns of Prejudice 4–5 
no. 42 (2008): 341–63; Mark Larrimore, “Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the Races,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 25 (2010): 99–125.
 6 Kant scholars have increasingly focused on his nonideal theory. See Dilek Huseyinzadegan, Kant’s 
Nonideal Theory of Politics (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2019); Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi 
(Ed.), Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives (New York, Oxford UP, 2014); 
Inés Valdez, Toward Transnational Cosmopolitanism: Kant, Du Bois, and Justice as a Political 
Craft (New York: Cambridge UP, 2019); Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human 
Development (New York: Cambridge UP, 2009). Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003). I leave aside the broader issue of the value of pragmatic anthropol-
ogy in Kant’s nonideal theory of justice. For a defense, see Robert B. Louden, “Anthropology from 
a Kantian Point of View: Toward a Cosmopolitan Conception of Human Nature,” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science 39 no. 4 (2008): 515–22; Robert B. Louden, Kant’s Human Being: 
Essays on his Theory of Human Nature (New York: Oxford UP, 2011) ch. 6; Allen Wood, Kant’s 
Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge UP, 1999) ch. 6.
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reform, particularly in the U.S. Building Kant’s Rechtsstaat in America show-
cases the potential power—and limit—of Kant’s mature political thought for the-
orizing racial justice.7 Although consistent in spirit, Kant’s mature political 
thought does not schematize the “virtues of justice”—to borrow a term from 
Onora O’Neill—that are characteristic of interracial civic fellowship to achieve 
racial justice reform and to advance a civil condition, although such virtues are 
necessary to implement the requirements of justice in constitutional regimes with 
significant structural racism and an imperfect record of governance with respect to 
racial matters.8 I thus offer an alternative Kantian nonideal theory of justice to 
advance racial justice reform.9 My proposal is broadly consistent with Kant, al-
though it is not to the letter of his mature political thought inasmuch as it focuses 
on a theory of noncoercible virtue rather than that of a coercive system of equal 
freedom under law or public right.
In Section II, I assess the function of Kant’s philosophy of race as part of 
his nonideal theory of justice, which proposes a racist pragmatic anthropology 
that employs the concept of race to determine the effectiveness of legislative 
reason to promote a civil condition. I argue that it is plausible to assume that 
Kant remains committed to a racial hierarchy that ranks racial groups accord-
ing to their historical advance of a civil condition, even after he assigns full 
juridical status to all humans in a cosmopolitan constitution. In Section III, I 
examine the key ideals in Kant’s model of reform in his mature political writ-
ings of the mid-1790s, namely citizenship and publicity. Finally, in Section 
IV, I enrich Kant’s model of reform with the ideal of interracial civic fellow-
ship, which should guide the public use of reason in racially exclusionary pol-
ities such as the U.S. The ideal of interracial civic fellowship captures how an 
autonomous but historically situated citizenry should participate in a nonideal 
public sphere to delegitimize racist laws and public policies. The virtues of 
justice that characterize interracial civic fellowship include speech, responsive 
engagement, and truthfulness. Though these virtues can promote justice in any 
nonideal circumstance, my presentation of them aims to delegitimize racial 
exclusion and promote racial justice reform.
 7 In this respect, my essay tackles Charles Mills’s suggestion to theorize a “black radical Kantianism.” 
This is not to say that, in my view, Kant is the only—or even the best resource—for theorizing racial 
justice reform. However, following Mills, it is instructive to illustrate the extent to which Kant is 
helpful resource for racial justice.
 8 Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Reconstructive Account of Practical Reasoning  
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1996) 133–41.
 9 The ideal of civic fellowship can promote republican ideals more broadly, but here I use it to coun-
teract racial exclusion and to promote racial justice specifically.
RECKONING WITH KANT ON RACE
5
II. KANT’S IDEAL AND NONIDEAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: THE 
PURPOSE OF HIS PHILOSOPHY OF RACE
A comprehensive theory of justice includes ideal and nonideal principles. Ideal 
theory models a just state under the conditions of strict or perfect compliance to 
the requirements of justice.10 It formulates principles that should constitute a 
well-ordered society. Tommie Shelby argues that, in contrast, nonideal theory 
“charts a feasible course, from where we stand now, to the realization of principles 
of justice.”11 Nonideal theory guides the implementation of the requirements of 
justice under the conditions of partial compliance—to wit, it starts “from where 
we stand now”—to remedy deviations from justice.12 The function of nonideal 
theory is to provide an accurate account of the nature of partial compliance and a 
method for solving this problem through the public use of reason in nonideal 
circumstances.
Given my characterization of ideal and nonideal theory, Kant’s practical philos-
ophy includes an ideal and nonideal theory of justice. Kant’s ideal theory of justice 
defends the idea of the social contract, which asserts the “pure” ideal of a just state 
(Rechtsstaat). To wit, the idea of the social contract represents a system of equal 
freedom under law or public right. It defends a republican constitutional state that 
must accord with the Universal Principle of Right: “an action is right if it can coexist 
with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the 
freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with 
universal law.”13 The universal principle of right establishes relations of external 
freedom to ensure that no individual is subject to the ends of another without their 
consent. Relations of external freedom enable each person to be a master of their 
lives as innately free (sui juris). A citizen of a legitimate state is entitled by innate 
right to exercise their free choice without undue interference by another’s power of 
choice; and the idea of a system of equal freedom under law allows persons to move 
their bodies, rightfully, through space and time. Under the just institutional condi-
tions of public right, citizens are subject to the coercive power of the law but free to 
pursue their ends in reciprocal relations of nondomination. Kant’s theory of justice 
 10 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the ideal/nonideal theory debate. For further discus-
sion, see Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Nonideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7 
no. 9 (2012): 654–64; Tamar Schapiro, “Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal 
Conditions,” The Journal of Philosophy 100 no. 7 (2003): 329–55.
 11 Tommie Shelby, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” Critical 
Philosophy of Race 1 no. 2 (2013): 145–62, 151.
 12 Shelby (2013): 148. Though there is much to say about compensatory justice and Kant’s practical 
philosophy, in this article, I limit my discussion of Kant’s “nonideal” theory to the issue of imple-
mentation of the requirements of justice rather than the rectification of past injustice.
 13 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Cambridge UP, 1996) 24.
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is grounded in an innate right to freedom and does not incorporate empirical or his-
torical facts about human nature or the organization of existent societies for its jus-
tification.14 In other words, a lack of compliance cannot detract from its unconditional 
prescriptive force. The idea of public right is justified by the innate right to freedom, 
which is the sole innate right of humanity and establishes a perfect duty to enter a 
civil condition, that is, to actualize the principle of justice by founding and refining 
constitutional republics.
Kant’s nonideal theory of justice, however, does address the matter of partial 
compliance to the requirements of justice. His nonideal theory assesses the inher-
ent ineptitude, as well as the suitability, of the human species to advance the re-
quirements of morality and justice through historical time.15 Namely, his pragmatic 
anthropology ascertains the effectiveness of legislative reason to shape constitu-
tional republics. It considers human nature as an object of “scientific” study. In his 
essays on race (1775–88) and in his lectures on anthropology and physical geog-
raphy (1781–82), Kant treats race as an object of study for the natural sciences of 
his day.16 As philosophers of race have noted in extensive detail, he pioneers 
modern scientific racism.17 Advancing a monogenetic theory of race, he holds that 
all racial groups are members of the human species because we descend from an 
“original phylum.”18 In response to environmental pressures, the human species 
developed a set of “seeds” (Keime) into a shared set of “natural predispositions” 
(Naturanlangen).19 The formation of racial groups is irreversible and entails such 
heritable “racial” features as skin color and hair texture, to which he assigns prag-
matic relevance: the deformation of character and intellect. He thus sketches a 
“natural history” of the human species to survey the historical development of a 
“pragmatic disposition” to enter a civil condition.20
For Kant, racial biology tracks the unequal historical development of the spe-
cies, ranking races according to their preparation to promote a civil condition.21 
 14 Louden (2000): 12.
 15 Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology (New York: Cambridge UP, 1996) 94.
 16 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology (New York: Cambridge UP, 2012) 274; “Of the Different 
Races of Human Beings (1775; 2nd edn 1777); “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race” 
(1785); and “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” Anthropology, History, and 
Education. Guenther Zoeller, ed. Robert B. Louden (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007).
 17 Kant (2012): 274–76; Kant (2007): 199; Bernasconi, Robert. “Who Invented the Concept of Race? 
Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race,” Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001) 11–36.
 18 Kant (2007): 199–200; Kant, “On the Different Races of Human Beings,” pp. 84–85; Boxill, 
Bernard. “Racism and Kantian Teleology,” Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of Race, ed. Naomi 
Zack (New York: Oxford UP, 2016) 44–53, 46.
 19 Kant (2007): 85.
 20 Kant (2007): 418–19.
 21 Louden (2000): 94–95.
RECKONING WITH KANT ON RACE
7
Although all human beings share the same cognitive apparatus as a reproductive 
species, he observes that, in fact, some racial groups are better prepared than 
others to exercise an innate capacity for legislative reason in the light of their 
sociocultural habits. He comments: “We find nations that do not appear to have 
progressed in the perfection of human nature, but have come to a standstill, 
while others, as in Europe, are always progressing.”22 He thus offers a natural 
history of the “Negro,” “Red,” and “Yellow” races to showcase their indisposi-
tions to enter and promote a civil condition.23 Not only does Kant fail to con-
demn slavery and colonialism until the 1790s, but he cites proslavery texts and 
sensational travelogs to confirm what he believes are the setbacks of nonwhite 
racial identity for advancing practical freedom.24 Kant’s philosophy of race is 
thus meant to illustrate the human species’ tendency to deviate from the require-
ments of justice inasmuch as certain racial groups appear unprepared to promote 
a civil condition.
In response, numerous Kant scholars have argued that Kant’s philosophy of 
race “contradicts” his moral and political universalism inasmuch as his formula-
tions of moral personhood, rational practical agency, and public right “contradict” 
his philosophy of race. But it is not clear in what sense Kant’s ideal theory is in-
compatible with his racist nonideal theory about how legislative reason becomes 
practically effective in historical time. His defense of racial hierarchy is consis-
tent with the contention that all human beings are rational practical agents to 
whom the universal principle of justice applies. Indeed, the accusation that people 
of color have failed to promote a civil condition presupposes that all human be-
ings should promote it, that is, that they are rational practical agents who can act 
on the basis of reasons, if they choose to do so. And so, insisting that people of 
color are “persons” in Kant’s narrow sense of the term in moral, public, and cos-
mopolitan right does not altogether dissolve his racial hierarchy.25 His racial hier-
archy emerges in the light of his pseudoscientific survey of the historical 
development of legislative reason, capturing what he believes to be the racialized 
sociocultural reality of partial compliance around the globe. He appeals to diverse 
sociocultural expressions for “evidence” of the unsuccessful realization of 
 22 Kant (2012): 274.
 23 These are the four relevant races Kant lists in his (2012): 320–21; Kant (2007): 197.
 24 Kleingeld (2007): 574. Kant’s writing on racial biology prior to the 1790s suggests that slavery and 
colonialism provide a kind of “moral education,” as European religious and cultural traditions—and 
knack for economic exploitation—activate a dormant capacity for legislative reason.
 25 This is the route that most Kant scholars take to save Kant from himself, but it only establishes moral 
and juridical duties that forbid the political domination and use of persons as mere means; moral and 
public right does not require that civic fellows also view each other as fully actualized members of 
the human species. Cf. Allais (2016): 17–20.
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practical freedom among peoples.26 For him, uneven sociocultural development is 
a “natural,” apparently empirically-confirmable fact about the human species.27 
Therefore, the contention that persons of color possess full juridical status by 
virtue of an innate right to freedom does not by itself improve their inferior rank 
in his racial hierarchy.28 In other words, while the late Kant comes to believe that 
no human beings ought to be dominated under a cosmopolitan constitution, he at 
the same time maintains that some racial groups have failed to actualize their full 
potential as members of the human species and as subjects of cosmopolitan right. 
As Robert Bernasconi aptly puts it, in his mature political thought, Kant contin-
ued to integrate “his racism into his philosophy of history in a particularly disturb-
ing way.”29
In two well-known essays, Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant held racist views 
in his early period, but second thoughts led him to abandon them.30 By the mid-
1790s, with the publication of Perpetual Peace, Metaphysics of Morals, and 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant is no longer committed to 
racial hierarchy, as he comes to recognize the inconsistency between his moral 
universalism and his philosophy of race. He assigns full juridical status to all hu-
mans in cosmopolitan right and supports the self-determination of all peoples 
around the globe against European encroachment:
Instead of his earlier claims that Africans and Native Americans cannot govern themselves and that 
Europe will probably eventually legislate for them, Kant now envisions a world in which peoples on 
different continents establish peaceful relations with each other. He sketches a vision of a world in 
which ‘distant parts of the world can enter peaceably into relations with one another, which can 
 26 By “ethnic,” I mean Kant’s characterization of a group with shared ancestry and sociocultural prac-
tices; he often also refers to “spirited” groups as a “people” or a “nation.”
 27 In the preface of the Anthropology, Kant asserts that pragmatic knowledge reflects “knowledge of 
the human being as citizen of the world, [but] knowledge of the races of human beings as products 
belonging to the play of nature is not yet counted as pragmatic knowledge of the world, but only as 
theoretical knowledge of the world” (p. 4). I take this often-quoted passage in defense of Kant’s 
moral rehabilitation to mean that practical freedom has not been fully actualized in the properly 
historical, that is, political sense among nonwhite racial groups. For it is plausible that Kant assumes 
that nonwhite racial groups lack “pragmatic knowledge” inasmuch as he takes it for granted that 
they remain “products belonging to the play of nature.” Many thanks to Pauline Kleingeld for press-
ing me on this point.
 28 One might opt to demonstrate the efficacy of global legislative reason—that people of color can, and 
do, satisfy the requirements of morality and justice—and point to historical evidence of complex 
civilizations, surveying millennia of rich intellectual, cultural, and political traditions. This kind of 
historical research is crucial, but, on my view, should be coupled with scrutiny of the habits of judg-
ment that attribute to people of color a cultural backwardness in the first place, and assume white-
ness is the universal marker of political modernity.
 29 Robert Bernasconi, “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race,” Reading Kant’s Geography, ed. Stuart Eldon 
and Eduardo Mendieta (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011) 291–318, 307.
 30 Kleingeld (2007): 586–92; Kleingeld (2014): 52–58.
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ultimately become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan 
constitution’ (ZeF 8:358). He expresses the hope that all states of the world will form a union, ‘for a 
lawful settlement of their disputes (by analogy with a universal state)’ (ZeF 8:379), and he writes that 
this ‘state of peoples’ (Völkerstaat) would ‘finally encompass all of the peoples of the earth’ (ZeF 
8:357). […] All peoples of the earth are to strive towards a single union of states, which will settle 
their conflicts at a federal level, instead of Europe being mentioned as the one continent in charge.31
Kleingeld claims that Kant “now envisions a world in which peoples on different 
continents establish peaceful relations with each other.” In assigning full juridical 
status to all humans, she posits that the cultural life forms of peoples “on other 
continents” should not be violated or interfered with by Europeans.32 “Hunting” 
and “farming” peoples who “want to plant orchards, and so forth” should be free 
to use their territories as they please.33 For Europeans should not be considered the 
leaders of the world and all peoples are entitled to self-determination.
Note that Kleingeld concedes that Kant still “defends the normative ideal of the 
state as a republic, a self-legislative, self-determining union of citizens and he no 
longer argues that other races are incapable of achieving this.”34 In other words, 
the normative ideal of a republican constitutional state remains essential to Kant’s 
mature theory of justice. In my view, his committment to the norative ideal of the 
republic constitutional state presents three viable options for tackling the racial 
hierarchy in his mature political thought:
1. First, one can identify ie ipso the self-determination of peoples around 
the globe with the advance of constitutional republicanism, thereby 
locating all racial groups on the same plane, so to speak, of historical 
development. In other words, whatever activities a people might 
pursue, they are nevertheless advancing a civil condition at the same 
time.35 However, there are two reasons one cannot plausibly attribute 
this position to the mature Kant. First, as detailed above, Kant makes 
numerous claims that strongly suggest a cultural chauvinism akin 
to what critical race theorists describe as cultural or imperial racism.36 
For “Kant accepts the imperialist’s premise that the Europeans have 
a more advanced culture than the people they have conquered.”37 
 31 Kleingeld (2007): 58.
 32 Ibid: 57.
 33 Ibid: 57. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant asserts, “so long as they [hunting, pasturing, and farm-
ing peoples] keep within their boundaries, the way they want to live on their land is up to their own 
discretion” (p. 53).
 34 Kleingeld (2014): 58.
 35 In favor of this line, consider that Kant countenances that the force of nature prompts the involuntary 
historical development of peoples in spite of their worst selves, that is, “unsocial socialibility.”
 36 Linda M. Alcoff, Visible Identities (New York: Oxford UP, 2006) 274–75.
 37 Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge UP, 1999) 299.
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Moreover, Kant maintains that it is critical to point out the extent 
to which nations fail to live up to the idea of public right and 
thereby highlight the dramatic extent to which we as a species are 
not on the same “plane” of historical development. Second, Kant 
lacks a notion of a “genuinely alternative modernity” wherein various 
racial groups around the globe advance the public institutional con-
ditions of right on their own terms.38 Specifically, he does not imagine 
that the self-determination of racial groups can use models of modern 
statecraft that do not look to Europe for guidance and inspiration. 
In other words, in his nonideal theory of justice the universal prin-
ciple of justice seems to entail, substantively, European public political 
culture. In Kant’s mature view, he simply grants that other peoples 
might achieve European institutional conditions as well. He does 
not entertain the possibility that political modernity, i.e., the self-de-
termination of a people under the idea of public and cosmopolitan 
right, might take different paths around the globe and achieve sui 
generis institutional expressions of modern public political culture.39 
To make matters more complicated, in order for the idea of alter-
native modernities to dismantle a racially chauvinist conception of 
human historical development, one must affirm some conception of 
the pragmatic significance of race. By locating racial groups on the 
same plane of historical development, one presupposes that racial 
groups, in fact, exist with a shared practical or ’spiritual’ identity 
oriented toward practical freedom. Otherwise one is supposed to 
assume that the fact that for Kant European public political culture 
substantively embodies practical freedom is an innocent coincidence. 
Note that Kleingeld denies the pragmatic significance of race alto-
gether in Kant’s mature political thought. But if one denies the 
pragmatic significance of race, then, “racialized” interpretive practices 
cannot, then, count as instances of the self-determination of a people 
 38 Hedrick (2008): 265.
 39 For example, though I cannot address the issue here, it is vital to consider whether the ideal of re-
publican constitutionalism covers indigenous claims to territorial sovereignty and self-determina-
tion in the Americas and around the globe. The de-colonial movements in Africa, the Caribbean, and 
South America also present special interpretative difficulties for using European-style constitutional 
republicanism as a universal prescriptive model for advancing reciprocal relations of nondomina-
tion. I do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to address these difficult cases using a broadly 
Kantian framework that rethinks what, substantively, constitutional republicanism must amount to. 
However, it is crucial to underscore how much reconstructive philosophical work needs to be done, 
particularly with respect to Kant’s underwhelming nonideal theory, to showcase how the universal 
principle of right might actualize a cosmopolitan constitution around the globe.
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in the advance of practical freedom. Rather, on Kleingeld’s reading, 
in the cosmopolitan constitution, we advance as individual members 
of the human species, who come together to establish republics, 
rather than as historically developing “spirited” or “racialized” groups. 
In other words, on such a reading, pace the noted Africana philos-
ophers Frank Kirkland and Sylvia Wynter, there can be no such 
thing as “modernity in Black.”40 Kleingeld favors instead a colorblind 
cosmopolitanism, in which shared racial identity has no influence 
on the exercise of political autonomy. She claims that the mature 
Kant comes to hold a merely “physiological” conception of race, 
denying its pragmatic relevance for the historical development of 
practical freedom.41
2. The second—in my view, undesirable—option is to retire constitu-
tional republicanism as an unconditionally binding ideal for human-
ity. In any case, Kant never gives up the ideal. He maintains that to 
the extent that other nations deviate from it, then the people share an 
indisposition to enter a civil condition. He is mindful that most peo-
ples, regardless of national, racial, or cultural origin, struggle to 
achieve a civil condition. However, inasmuch as he implicitly racial-
izes the sociocultural activities of a people and their potential to par-
ticipate in public right, his system retains a racial hierarchy.42 Indeed, 
 40 See Frank M. Kirkland, “Modernity and Intellectual Life in Black,” The Philosophical Forum 24 no. 
1–3 (1993): 136–65; Frank M. Kirkland, “Kant on Race and Transition,” Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy of Race, ed. Paul C. Taylor, Linda M. Alcoff, and Luvell Anderson (New York: Routledge, 
2018) 28–42; Sylvia Wynter, “Is ‘Development’ a Purely Empirical Concept or also Teleological?: A 
Perspective from ‘We the Underdeveloped,’” Prospects for Recovery and Sustainable Development 
in Africa, ed. A. Y. Yansané (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) 297–316.
 41 Kleingeld (2014): 58, 64–65. For a cultural theory of race, see Chike Jeffers’s essential article: “The 
Cultural Theory of Race: Yet Another Look at Du Bois’s ‘The Conservation of Races,’” Ethics 123 no. 
3 (2013): 403–26. For an excellent recent account of the significance of history for shaping racial iden-
tity in W.E.B. Du Bois’s influential philosophy of race, see Kimberly Ann Harris, “W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
‘Conservation of Races’: A Metaphilosophical Text,” Metaphilosophy 50 no. 5 (2019): 670–87.
 42 My point is not that Kant is and will always remain a racist simply by virtue of defending the prin-
ciple of right—the notion of an innate right to freedom. Rather, I aim to underline why in his mature 
political thought it is plausible to link sociohistorical underdevelopment with the race concept and 
the so-called spirit of a people. In other words, contrary to Kleingeld claim, on my view, race retains 
a pragmatic significance in Kant’s mature political thought, for he continues to refer to the “habits” 
that constitute a group’s “second nature.” In the Anthropology he surveys Europeans to assess their 
republican “spirit.” He mentions but dismisses Slavic and Turkish peoples as not worth serious 
consideration, which strongly implies that he also dismisses the normative character of the rest of 
the globe, that is, nonwhite racial groups and other “failed” whites (pp. 221–22). Many thanks to 
Pauline Kleingeld for discussion of these points.
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I submit, that the notion of “farming” and “hunting” peoples become 
racist dog whistles in his later work.43 For example, in the 
Anthropology, he asserts that “savage” pastoral and hunting peoples 
are often not motivated by “the concept of freedom under moral laws, 
but [by] the mere sensible representation of outer freedom.”44 His 
later condemnation of slavery and colonialism is, therefore, consist-
ent with the supposition that there remain shortcomings in nonwhites’ 
historical development.46 Indeed, he claims, “Of all ways of life, that 
of the hunter is undoubtedly most at odds with a civilised 
constitution.”46
To be clear, Kleingeld rightly stresses that in his late period Kant as-
signs people of color a juridical status that poses a normative con-
straint on European behavior. Undoubtedly, Kant “explicitly extends 
the principles of right to humans on all continents, and in which he 
clearly draws the pertinent conclusions regarding European colonial-
ism.”48 In the very same passage that she cites to confirm the exten-
sion of the cosmopolitan constitution, however, Kant also pleads for 
Europeans not to “exploit the ignorance of the natives.”48 He thus 
denigrates nonwhite a racial group, even as he grants that they, as 
equal subjects of a cosmopolitan constitution, should no longer en-
dure extreme violence, enslavement, the expropriation of their lands 
and resources, and European colonial occupation. I therefore submit 
that the mature Kant raises the original repulsive question that had 
inspired his racist pragmatic anthropology: whether or not certain 
 43 To be clear, Kant uses the adjective “edel” to describe pastoral lifestyles, which translates as 
“noble.” However, in the Anthropology he also likens pastoral peoples to newborn babies and sav-
ages, and so his comments about their “nobility” is more akin to Rousseau’s musing about the 
“noble savage” naked of modernity than respect for cultural differences (pp. 168–69). Strangely, 
Kleingeld downplays Kant’s repeated references to “civilized” European states: “[T]he statement is 
not necessarily comparative. It need not mean that states on other continents are not or cannot be 
civilized” (p. 56).
 44 Kant (2007): 169. Cf. Kant (1795): 102–03.
 45 Charles Mills conjectures that, for Kant, people of color are “subpersons” excluded from the ideal 
of right. Mills asserts that racial exclusion is not normatively salient in Kant’s (early and late) prac-
tical philosophy because Kant does not envision nonwhite races as partaking in modern statecraft in 
an interracial political effort. Charles W. Mills, Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial 
Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017); “Black Radical Kantianism,” Res Philosophica 95 no. 1 
(2018): 1–33; The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997) 11–19; “Kant’s Untermenschen,” 
Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, ed. Andrew Valls (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2005).
 46 Kant (1795): 110 Cf. Kant (1996): 172–73.
 47 Kleingeld (2014): 54.
 48 Kant (1996): 173.
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racial groups are fully “civilized,” such that they are prepared to ad-
vance right or would rather prefer to “plant orchards, and so forth.”
3. Finally, for the remainder of this essay, I develop a third option to 
tackle the racism in Kant’s mature political thought. I reconstruct 
a Kantian nonideal theory of justice, that is, I model racial justice 
reform for profoundly nonideal polities such as the U.S. Kant’s rac-
ist pragmatic anthropology attempts to explain partial compliance to 
the requirements of justice by posting a civil indisposition in people 
of color and a civil disposition in whites. But neither group actually 
possesses these characterological dispositions. The relevant incon-
sistency in Kant’s practical philosophy is, therefore, not between his 
ideal theory and his philosophy of race. One can affirm the moral and 
juridical equality of racial groups, as Kant does in his late period, 
while maintaining that, on the whole, their historical development 
does not meet a normative threshold of a fully “civilized” people. 
Rather, I show that the relevant inconsistency is between actual mod-
ern racial realities and his inaccurte characterization of racial reali-
ties in his nonideal theory of justice, which fails to represent the true 
nature of partial compliance in the world. Namely, I submit that Kant 
posits a civil disposition in a racial group that in reality systemati-
cally dominates other racial groups. He thereby ignores the obstacle 
that white racism poses to the historical development of justice. He 
posits, instead, the ostensible “backwardness” of nonwhite races to 
explain why global progress has stalled. Consequently, in my view, 
Kant’s nonideal theory of justice neglects to redress white civil indis-
position toward vulnerable racial groups as an obstacle to progress.
In pursuing this option, rather than scrutinize the efficacy of legisla-
tive reason in nonwhite racial groups around the world, I seek to dis-
pel the illusion that white-controlled polities in Europe and North 
America have substantively actualized the universal principle of right 
in the first place and have intimated a republican constitutionalism at 
all.49 In pursing this line of interpretation I highlight the obstacle that 
white racism continues to pose for the advance of republican ideals in 
self-described constitutional republics with a longstanding history of 
incivility toward people of color.
 49 To be sure, I believe this option is consistent with Kleingeld’s defense of public and cosmopolitan 
right. However, I seek to show more than that Kant became a critic of slavery and colonialism to 
demonstrate his value as an anti-racist critic.
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III. KANT ON CITIZENSHIP, PUBLICITY, AND REFORM
Kant’s political thought has promise—and limits—for combatting the weak-
ness of the public sphere in modern societies that tolerate racial domination, some-
times for hundreds of years, as in the case of the U.S., which gave extensive 
constitutional protections for the ownership of black people by white people and 
attempted to rationalize such protections as consistent with the liberal values of 
freedom and equality. Kant’s mature political philosophy provides at least two 
significant normative resources for reforming imperfect constitutional states: the 
“pure” ideal of active citizenship and the a priori principle of publicity.50 These 
are interdependent concepts of his “ideal theory” of justice: publicity presupposes 
a citizenry who subject the status quo to public scrutiny. As Elizabeth Ellis notes, 
publicity is “the mechanism of progress” in Kant’s political philosophy, and it 
defines his conception of the purpose of politics as an ongoing attempt to make the 
transcendental ideal of public right an empirical reality in a particular polity.51 The 
state thus undergoes “an infinite process of gradual approximation” to right.52 
However, the manner in which the a priori principle of publicity—as a shared 
activity of a plurality of citizens—achieves reciprocal relations of nondomination 
is underdeveloped in Kant’s thought. In this section, I argue that the ideal of active 
citizenship for all should guide the public scrutiny of the status quo. In the next 
section, I further supplement Kant’s model of reform with the “impure” ideal of 
interracial civic fellowship in modern states that historically support racial 
domination.
A. The Ideal of Active Citizenship
In Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the pure ideal of citi-
zenship consists of three “essential” attributes, that of freedom, equality, and inde-
pendence.53 He defines citizens as a plurality of free, equal, and independent 
persons who have a moral right to (a) consent to the laws that govern them, (b) 
establish the civil equality of persons as equal subjects before the law, such that 
among the people no one has “any superior with the moral capacity to bind [one] 
as a matter of right in a way that [one] could not in turn bind the other,” and (c) 
 50 Kant provides several different formulations of publicity. I focus on his definition of the a priori 
principle of publicity in Perpetual Peace because it offers the most systematic account of the func-
tion of public reason in his theory of justice.
 51 Elizabeth Ellis, Kant’s Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (New Haven: Yale UP, 
2005) 184; Kant, Perpetual Peace in Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 
130.
 52 Ellis (2005): 151; Kant (1795): 130.
 53 Kant (1996): 91.
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achieve civil independence through one’s “rights and powers as a member of a 
commonwealth acting from [one’s] own choice in a community with others.”54 
Civil independence (c) makes a person an active citizen by giving them a public 
voice in republican politics. Active citizens together propose laws and public pol-
icies whose legitimacy their collective judgment authorizes. They acquire a “civil 
personality” through the ballot and the co-legislation of the general will as civic 
equals.55 While all persons are “naturally” moral equals by virtue of our shared 
rational humanity, civil independence alone indicates that a person has achieved 
public recognition as a free and equal citizen to direct modern statecraft. As a 
consequence, their civic fellows recognize their moral right to scrutinize and re-
structure public institutional arrangements on the basis of their determinate judg-
ment of what justice requires.
Kant distinguishes the pure ideal of active citizenship from passive citizenship. 
Unlike active citizens, passive citizens lack civil independence because they are 
forced to rely on others for subsistence in a free market society. They live in rela-
tions of dependence as private civilians. Women, people of color, day laborers, 
domestic servants, and anyone who lacks the means for economic self-sufficiency 
are passive citizens; and, for Kant, their dependence on others warrants their 
political exclusion and civic inequality.56 He does not believe that relations of 
private dependence delegitimize a republican state. Instead, he argues that passive 
citizenship is consistent with republican liberalism, so long as a person’s “natural 
rights” are not violated. One can therefore have juridical recognition as a “free” 
and “equal” subject before the law but remain a mere associate, rather than an 
active and independent citizen, of the polity.57 Possessing full juridical status is 
consistent with the civic inequality of persons as lawmaking citizens and partici-
pants in the public sphere. Kant adds that in a legitimate polity second-class 
citizens can “work” themselves into active citizens, so that gradual reforms 
achieve the pure ideal of active citizenship for all.58 Unfortunately, he provides 
little insight to explain what “working up” into active citizenship entails. 
Specifically, he fails to consider whether those who already enjoy active citizen-
ship must cultivate habits of citizenship and judgment to scrutinize prevailing 
private relations of dependence. Instead, he claims that by “working themselves 
into a rightful condition,” second-class citizens somehow extract the public 
 54 Ibid: 91.
 55 Ibid: 91.
 56 Ibid: 92. Kant worries that economic dependence makes a person a mouthpiece for the private inter-
ests of their employers, thereby particularizing the general will.
 57 Kant assumes that a person’s innate right to freedom can secure certain “basic” legal protections, 
even if she lacks civil independence in the public sphere. In a legitimate state, for Kant, civic in-
equality in the polity is consistent with the moral equality of persons.
 58 Kant (1996): 92.
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recognition of their moral right to civil independence from dominant members of 
the public sphere who already enjoy civil independence.59
B. Centering the Ideal of Active Citizenship in Kant’s Model of Reform
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant suggests a model of reform that, alternatively, 
posits an obligation to assist our civic fellows who are forced to live in relations of 
private dependence and to recognize their rightful claims for public recognition as 
our civic equals. In his mature political writings, the ideal of free, equal, and inde-
pendent citizenship emerges as a standard for the proper use of public reason and 
as a guide for the reform of imperfect states. It obligates citizens to increasingly 
come to recognize and elevate each other as free, equal, and independent citizens; 
as a result of this sort of ongoing political practice, the universal principle of right 
is realized.60 The creation of rightful conditions is, then, the outcome of reshaping 
habits of political judgment to increasingly promote the ideal of active citizenship 
for all. The free use of public reason or freedom of speech is thus not the “mere 
absence of constraint” and should not “amount to unconstrained babble.”61 In its 
public (as in its private) dimension, practical reason imposes constraints or stan-
dards for its proper use. While Kant does not explicitly state that the ideal of citi-
zenship should be taken as a standard for public reasoning—nor does he restrict 
other ways of exercising freedom of speech—there is ample evidence in The 
Metaphysics of Morals and Perpetual Peace that it is indispensable for actualizing 
rightful conditions (i.e., reciprocal relations of nondomination) from the first-per-
son, agential perspective of republican citizens fighting for progressive reforms.
First, in Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant presents publicity as an a priori “tran-
scendental” principle of politics that provides a “formal constraint” on public rea-
son: “All actions relating to the right of other human beings are wrong if their 
maxim is not compatible with their being made public.”62 He adds that the princi-
ple of publicity presupposes the existence of a lawful state with a viable public 
 59 Varden argues that relations of dependence require the state to pass anti-poverty legislation. But in 
order for such legislation to pass, members of the public at large must first judge that adult persons, 
especially women and people of color, who are forced to live in relations of private dependence is 
inconsistent with the idea of public right. Otherwise, there would be no political will to pass any 
such legislation. Helga Varden, “Self-Governance and Reform in Kant’s Liberal Republicanism: 
Ideal and Nonideal Theory in Kant’s Doctrine of Right,” Doispontos 12 no. 2 (2016): 39–70.
 60 Kant posits that the duty of rightful honor (honeste vive) obligates citizens to assert one’s worth as a 
human being in relation to others and to speak out about one’s vulnerability to domination. My 
concern, however, is not on the failure of the oppressed to speak up, but on the public’s indifference 
and hostility to them.
 61 Onora O’Neill, Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics, and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 2015) 63.
 62 Kant (1795): 125–26.
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sphere, where any maxim can be “made public.” Outside of a lawful state, how-
ever, claims in the public sphere assert private interests.63 Free speech or freedom 
of the pen alone is, therefore, insufficient to advance reforms. In an illegitimate 
state, those with “decisive supremacy” do not need to conceal their maxims be-
cause they have a monopoly on political power—they can say whatever they want. 
They refuse to recognize others as a legitimate source of political obligation and 
in doing so undermine the capacity for all to be self-governing (sui generis) mas-
ters of their own lives. In a lawful state, however, public servants, lawmakers, and 
members of the polity must be prepared to recognize the claims of others as posing 
a legitimate normative constraint on institutional arrangements. The normative 
ideal of a lawful state thus entails the gradual realization of the ideal of active 
citizenship for all. Moreover, in a state where the people cannot participate in the 
public sphere, there can be no way to tell whether a maxim is incompatible with it 
being made public, as no one can voice grievances or objections. A lawful state 
must have a public sphere increasingly controlled by active citizens to determine 
whether or not a proposed claim has injurious or exclusionary effects. In a state 
without a viable public sphere that makes it possible for all to (eventually) achieve 
the ideal of active citizenship, publicity cannot advance justice and “all its reason-
ings are unwise and veiled injustice.”64
Second, actual members of imperfect states are ultimately responsible for im-
plementing the requirements of justice, as they learn to co-legislate principles of 
governance as civic equals and to impose political changes from the ground up. 
Kant’s formulation of the principle of publicity appeals to the republican ideal of 
self-government: the judgment of ordinary citizens must establish and authorize 
the laws and public policies that will govern them. In order for their efforts to re-
sult in reciprocal relations of nondomination, an imperfect people must learn to 
take the ideal of citizenship for all as a crucial constraint on their political judg-
ment.65 This is important because, in reality, the state itself—and private civil-
ians—often cause and condone relations of dependence.66 The pure ideal of active 
citizenship obligates citizens to recognize and advance the civil independence of 
all by directing their attention to the experiences of systematic dependence shared 
by vulnerable social groups. To advance just institutional arrangements and fair 
 63 Ibid: 129.
 64 Ibid: 129.
 65 Cf. Sarah Holtman, “Kant, Justice, and Civic Fellowship,” Politics and Teleology in Kant, ed. P. 
Formosa, A. Goldman, and T. Patrone (Cardiff: U of Wales P, 2014) 121.
 66 See also Jacob Weinrib, “Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence,” Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 33 (2008): 1–25; Ariel Zylberman, “The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second 
Personal Constitution of Freedom,” Kantian Review 21 no. 1 (2016): 101–26; Elizabeth Ellis, 
“Citizenship and Property Rights: A New Look at Social Contract Theory,” The Journal of Politics 
68 no. 3 (2006): 544–55.
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terms of social cooperation, a people must discern, in detail, existent social in-
equalities that plague their polity.
If one is accustomed to monopolizing political power or benefits from the so-
cial and economic powerlessness of others, accepting—much less, promoting!—
structural reforms will be difficult without an accompanying shift in attitude and 
habits of judgment. Kant neglects to consider that if a vulnerable social group 
attempts to advocate for their own independence, they have little chance that their 
efforts will succeed without an accompanying attitudinal shift in their civic fel-
lows. It seems more likely that a public that views civil dependence as consis-
tent with the natural equality of persons, the struggle for structural reforms can 
strengthen the public’s contempt and indifference to their plight. This possibility 
is especially troubling if the state is the cause of asymmetrical relations of depen-
dence. Existent relations of dependence must become a salient public concern. 
The failure to understand and confront them is a distinct failure of the public use 
of reason. Unfortunately, Kant’s mature theory of reform does not stress existent 
social inequalities to guide the proper use of public reason.
IV. CIVIC FELLOWSHIP AND THE VIRTUES OF JUSTICE: BUILDING 
KANT’S RECHTSSTAAT IN THE U.S.
As part of a nonideal theory of justice, the ideal of interracial civic fellowship 
not only addresses the reality of partial compliance, highlighting the obstacle that 
habits of racist judgment pose for the advance of justice. But it also provides a 
political solution to the problem of racial exclusion by cultivating habits of politi-
cal judgment. The ideal of interracial civic fellowship develops a “habit of atten-
tion” based on “good will” that is oriented toward historically excluded racial 
groups.67 Kant’s original formulations of right, citizenship, and publicity do not 
demand such a determinate form of public engagement to counteract racist incivil-
ity. In states that condone racial domination, the weakness of the public sphere 
often reflects the decline—or total absence—of interracial civic fellowship in the 
public sphere.68 In such circumstances, at least in the U.S. communities of color—
and black communities in particular—are not viewed as a legitimate source of 
political obligation for public institutions; racist public policies and laws are, then, 
prone to acquire a perceived legitimacy in a nonideal public sphere. In states with 
significant structural inequalities, citizens must acquire virtues that refine their 
 67 Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education 
(Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2004) 134–37.
 68 O’Neill (1996): 187; Ellis (2005): 12.
RECKONING WITH KANT ON RACE
19
capacity to evaluate the claims of others with whom they are historically unaccus-
tomed to share political power as civic equals.69
The capacity to listen to others and to judge each other’s claims fairly—with an 
attitude of civility and respect—Onora O’Neill identifies as the “virtues of jus-
tice,” which “includes [the committment to] justice itself, as well as varied forms 
of fairness, of […] respect for others, of fidelity and probity, and of truthfulness 
and honesty” in the public sphere.70 The virtues of justice encompass a range of 
excellences that broadly fall under the ideal of “civic fellowship.”71 They are non-
coercible ethical duties that refine one’s capacity for political judgment to scruti-
nize legislation in the light of its morally injurious and exclusionary effects. They 
are indispensable for actualizing rightful conditions that counteract the partiality 
of the general will in imperfect polities. Expressed across racial lines, the virtues 
of justices can help refound an increasingly just, unified, and inclusive polity.72
The virtues of justice that express interracial civic fellowship compel the public 
to confront, in a judicious and thoughtful manner, the experience of racial domi-
nation by vulnerable racial groups and to recognize people of color as equally 
entitled to share and direct political power.73 Consider some key virtues of justice 
that are characteristic of interracial civic fellowship and might advance racial jus-
tice reform. First, speech and responsive public engagement are virtues of racial 
justice. One talks to one’s fellows and is responsive to their claims, especially 
those concerning wrongdoing, if one is invested in maintaining a cooperative re-
lationship with them as a civic equal. If citizens remain “locked up” in themselves, 
the prospect of justice dims, as no one would bother speaking to strangers to voice 
their misgivings.74 In a state that historically supports racial exclusion, the project 
 69 Moreover, even as ostensibly “equal” juridical subjects, without the accompanying ideal of interra-
cial civic fellowship, whites can maintain a disposition of sociocultural superiority over their non-
white civic fellows and thereby remain unlikely to view racial injustice as an object of public 
concern.
 70 O’Neill (1996): 187. O’Neill adds: “Since institutions are never perfect, the virtues of justice are 
never redundant: if institutions are not knave-proof, it helps not to have too many knaves around” 
(p. 187).
 71 See Sarah Holtman, “Civility and Hospitality: Justice and Social Grace in Trying Times,” Kantian 
Review 6 (2002): 85–108; Holtman (2014): 120–21. See also Allen (2004): 119–39.
 72 Cf. Louden (2000): 160. My discussion focuses on domestic justice, with an eye on the U.S. The 
ideal of interracial civic fellowship is not only compatible with cosmopolitan right, but domestic 
right must also include cosmopolitan right in a comprehensive Kantian theory of justice. See Pauline 
Kleingeld, “Kantian Patriotism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 no. 4 (2000): 313–41.
 73 A distinct set of virtues cultivates ties of black political solidarity to counteract racial domination. 
See Rogers Melvin L. “Race, Domination, and Republicanism,” Difference without Domination: On 
Justice and Democracy in Conditions of Domination, ed. D. Allen and R. Somanathan (Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 2020) 15–16; Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Black Solidarity (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007) 201–58.
 74 Kant (1996): 217.
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of reform creates a distinctive challenge for white citizens who hold a monopoly 
on power and illicit privileges: they must learn to recognize the validity of the 
claims that persons of color make and give up their excess of political power and 
resources for the sake of justice. That is, they must learn to hear the claims of 
others; and, if a claim is valid, they must be prepared to respond appropriately.75 
Namely, they must be prepared to concede the validity of a claim in an interracial 
cooperative effort to advance rights and redistribute resources. The virtue of re-
sponsive engagement, especially in white communities, is indispensable to miti-
gate the potential partiality of the general will to implement the requirements of 
justice across the color-line.
Unfortunately, those who have a monopoly on political power are often pre-
cisely those who create arbitrary restrictions on its access by vulnerable racial 
groups and deceive themselves into believing that such restrictions are consistent 
with the principles of republican governance.76 The principle of publicity is the 
mechanism of progress precisely because it challenges habits of partial reasoning 
that discount the claims of others for arbitrary reasons, although the dominant 
(white) citizenry often lack the moral self-awareness that their partial judgment is, 
well, partial. Instead, it is often for those historically excluded from the public 
sphere that the partiality of the general will is normatively salient. The virtue of 
responsive engagement is thus necessary to counteract this phenomenon, espe-
cially among the white citizenry.
In communities of color, the responsive engagement of others can build trust that 
one’s claims will be heard and that one’s (white) civic fellows will seriously consider 
public measures to address an injustice. In a state that historically supports racial 
domination, the pursuit of reforms creates a distinctive challenge for black citizens 
and other historically excluded racial groups. For, speaking to whites can seem like—
and often is—a waste of time. Besides outright murder, the U.S. routinely intimi-
dates, deports, exiles, and imprisons people of color. Oftentimes, their claims are met 
with blank indifference. It can be foolhardy, at best, and a threat to self-respect and 
even one’s very life, at worst, to trust anyone who has treated you this way for a long 
time or to expect them to change. But were white citizens to develop the virtue of re-
sponsive engagement—and become prepared to sacrifice their self-interest and illicit 
economic and political power for the sake of justice—trust can be slowly earned and 
restored across racial lines. However, the advance of right requires the public to wel-
come the judgment and experiences of communities of color. Racist laws and public 
 75 Contrast the virtue of responsive engagement with Ripstein’s contention that “a condition of public 
right includes your right to speak in your own name, including your right to address not only those 
near you but the public. Others do not need to pay attention to you, but they must be the ones who 
decide for themselves whether to pay attention.” in Force and Freedom, p. 293; emphasis added.
 76 Cf. Allais (2017): 28–30.
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policy will only lose a perceived legitimacy when there is widespread acceptance of 
the validity of the black and brown experience of the basic structure of modern U.S. 
society. With the virtue of responsiveness guiding the public use of reason, the suc-
cess of reforms that target structural racism is more likely. Indeed, the requirements 
of justice more broadly can be bettered implemented as existent social inequalities 
become normative salient in the public sphere.
Additionally, the virtue of truthfulness encourages public reasoning in light of 
accurate natural scientific, social scientific, and historical facts.77 It narrows the 
scope of reasonable disagreement by casting doubt on claims that are not sup-
ported by evidence or common experience. As Jennifer Uleman argues, relevant 
facts about the modern human condition “develop guidelines for protecting exter-
nal freedom in common, determinate situations.”78 The polity must, then, confront 
the centrality of the historical and contemporary reality of racial domination. 
Assume that one sincerely aims to realize the innate right to freedom for all, if one 
does not believe that structural racism is a fact about the world and lacks a basic 
understanding of its (common and longstanding) experience in communities of 
color, then, one is unlikely to focus on the problem of racial exclusion to advance 
rightful conditions. Members of the public, however, are obligated to confront the 
shared experience of exclusion and dependence to advance the requirements of 
justice. In order to do this with increasing felicity, as interracial civic fellows, 
citizens must understand the distinct forms that racial exclusion takes in their pol-
ity. In the spirit of truthfulness, then, citizens must develop some basic moral lit-
eracy concerning, at the very least, who is subject to racist exclusion and who 
benefits from it. In a racially inegalitarian society, the virtue of truthfulness com-
pels citizens to develop a sensitivity to patterns of racial exclusion by taking care 
to evaluate the claims of historically excluded racial groups with good will. At the 
very least, one must accept that in one’s particular polity there are racial groups 
who have been subject to historical exclusion in the first place.
Of course, one can acknowledge the history of racial injustice but believe that 
racial exclusion is a thing of the past. But the virtue of truthfulness that character-
izes the ideal of interracial civic fellowship encourages citizens to confront their 
own inclination for self-deception with respect to racial matters. The purpose of 
undertaking a judicious examination of habits of judgment is to reveal just how 
such patterns continue to shape habits of judgment today that either in conception 
or in effect support arbitrary restrictions on access to the ballot, basic opportuni-
ties, and the fair distribute of material resources. For historical exclusion on the 
arbitrary basis of membership in a racial group is often what renders a person 
 77 Cf. Jennifer K. Uleman, “External Freedom in Kant’s Rechtslehre: Political, Metaphysical,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 no. 3 (2004): 578–601, 596.
 78 Uleman (2004): 597.
ELVIRA BASEVICH
22
vulnerable to racial exclusion in the present. To counteract the potential partial-
ity of the general will, all citizens must seriously consider and foreground, with 
good will, the black, Latinx, and indigenous experience of racial exclusion in the 
Americas—and this task remains perhaps the greatest political challenge in the 
U.S. And so, the virtues of justice, especially that of responsive engagement and 
truthfulness, ensure that exist racial inequalities pose a meaningful constraint on 
public reason.
One might object that for Kant the ideal of interracial civic fellowship is not a 
legitimate constraint on public reason. His theory of justice prohibits the coercion 
of the “ground determining choice.”79 The idea of public right constrains the spa-
tiotemporal expression of choice, which can only be legitimately constrained by 
another’s power of choice. A lawful state must recognize the right of all individu-
als to the free determination and pursuit of their ends, so long as their actions are 
consistent with all others’ exercising the same freedom of choice. It authorizes the 
use of coercion to remove hindrances to the spatiotemporal exercise of choice in 
order to maintain rightful “external” relations of freedom. But it cannot compro-
mise persons’ “internal” freedom to adopt ends—even those ends that lack moral 
worth. Kant thus writes: “anyone can be free so long as I do not impair his free-
dom by my external action, even though I am quite indifferent to his freedom or 
would like in my heart to infringe upon it.”80 Because one has a perfect—or a 
narrow juridical—duty to obey the law, the state can use external incentives to 
ensure compliance, coercing the “external” performance of actions that accord 
with right. Moral life, on the contrary, depends on the autonomy of a self-legislat-
ing will, that is, on the “internal determination of the will.”81 Coercion destroys 
the moral worth of action. If one lacks the intention to pursue a particular moral 
end, one cannot be said to have acted for the sake of moral law.
Although intentions cannot be coerced, republican politics presupposes that 
one shares a commitment with strangers to advance republican ideals and to par-
ticipate in a cooperative effort to perfect public institutions. Sara Holtman thus 
distinguishes between our stance as subjects to laws and as agents who make laws 
and shape public institutions:
there [is] an important difference between our stance as persons subject to laws and as lawmakers 
on the Kantian model. As subjects, we cannot be held to the requirement that we internalise, or act 
from, standards of justice on particular occasions. As lawmakers, though, it would seem that we 
must ensure that the standards of justice we recognise or enact indeed are moral laws, pure practical 
laws of reason that obligate those to whom they properly apply. They must be laws subjects could 
internalise consistent with their nature as moral beings […]. Although day-to-day compliance with 
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justice demands no moral motivation, an internalisation and commitment to the demands of justice 
may be necessary if we are successfully to shape and extend them as legislators […] or, indeed, as 
individuals deciding what actions to undertake. In sum, Kant’s discussions of the concept of justice 
and the relationship between justice and freedom seem to reserve a place for civic fellowship in the 
realms of lawmaking and interpretation.82
Thus, “in the realms of lawmaking and interpretation,” we ought to, as Kant puts 
it, “rise beyond mere obedience to formal law.”83 This means that citizens judge 
for themselves what sorts of formal constrains on the public use of reason facili-
tate the emergence of rightful conditions, given the distinct shortcomings of our 
political reality. To be sure, political judgment based on civic fellowship, like the 
principle of publicity itself, is not coercible.84 A state that attempts to stipulate, 
manipulate, or coerce the terms on which citizens judge it (or each other) destroys 
the moral worth—and effective normative force—of public judgment. There must 
be, therefore, a wide latitude for citizens to judge how best to advance their ties of 
civic fellowship and advance reforms, judging for themselves when and which 
changes to propose and what the ideal of civic fellowship should warrant in their 
interaction with others.85
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I show why it is plausible that Kant’s mature political thought 
retains a racist dimension and what Kant scholars can do about it. To wit, I expand 
Kant’s model of reform into a theory of racial justice reform for modern states that 
historically support racial exclusion, defending the pure principles of publicity 
and active citizenship as the mechanism of progress. I supplement Kant’s mature 
theory of reform with the impure ideal of interracial civic fellowship to guide the 
public use of reason in nonideal public spheres that historically condone racial 
exclusion. While no procedure for public deliberation guarantees morally per-
fect judgment, the ideal of interracial civic fellowship prepares citizens to share 
political power with those with whom they are historically unaccustomed to do 
so. The ideal of interracial civic fellowship reconstitutes the public sphere across 
racial lines to create an increasingly just and inclusive polity. The virtues of justice 
of responsiveness and truthfulness, especially among white citizenry in racially 
inegalitarian states, are necessary to reshape dominant habits of judgment to im-
plement the requirements of justice. The public at large must learn to counteract 
 82 Holtman (2014): 116.
 83 Kant (1991): 65.
 84 Kant asserts that the principle of publicity is both “ethical” (i.e., pertaining to a theory of virtue) and 
“juridical” (i.e., affecting the rights of man) (1795): 126.
 85 Kant (1996): 153.
ELVIRA BASEVICH
24
the partiality of its reasoning with respect to historically excluded groups and to 
develop basic moral literacy about racial matters. If one endures the longstanding 
misrecognition of one’s rights and privileges as a citizen, and historically lacks 
access to political power, then, one is more likely (to continue) to be subjected 
to arbitrary interference by others for whom one’s innate right to freedom is not 
considered to be a legitimate constraint on public right. As a consequence, one 
is restricted access to the ballot, basic opportunities, and material resources. The 
ideal of interracial civic fellowship aims to remedy structural racism and the ev-
er-widening racial inequalities in wealth, income, and basic opportunity.
By way of concluding, I would like to address two possible objections. First, 
one might object that my argument overlooks Kant’s own rejection of the rele-
vance of history in a theory of justice. Kant claims not only that the historical 
conditions under which modern states develop do not impact their legitimate right 
to govern.86 But he also objects that preoccupation with the historical conditions 
of the emergence of modern states threatens their public legislative authority. The 
violent and unseemly reality of their historical formation would inspire in the 
people an anarchistic rejection of public authority that plunges them into the state 
of nature. Moreover, Kant argues against developing a “moral culture” out of a 
“historical culture,” for “the culture of memory […] tries in vain to deduce moral-
ity from it.”87 His concern is that history is an inadequate standard for the forma-
tion of political judgment. To appeal to it risks making morality “appropriate to 
culture,” rather than promoting the moral education of the species by making cul-
ture conform to morality.88 To be sure, Kant’s caution against assigning weight to 
history reflects his fear that the public would perceive history as weakening uni-
versal standards of judgment. My proposal, instead, demonstrates that the formal 
demands of “ideal theory” justice and lawmaking under the conditions of strict 
compliance require a nonideal theory for the determinate reorientation of public 
reason. A nonideal theory of justice must, then, bring members of the public to 
understand the historical formation of social inequalities and to focus on the 
shared experience of racial exclusion, as it is communicated by civic fellows. My 
proposal thus educates public moral perception about the normative salience of 
race and racism in public reason. What is more, the issues of the unconditional 
right of a state to govern and that of its systematic failure to govern well in reality 
are distinct. The political project of reform presupposes that one has a moral right 
to subject the status quo to public scrutiny without either rejecting the state’s le-
gitimate right to rule or tolerating unjust laws. This is the balance that the ongoing 
task of republican politics must strike through the cultivation of habits of political 
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judgment. The ideal of interracial civic fellowship is thus meant to develop—not 
overthrow—public legislative authority as part of a nonideal theory of justice.
Second, one might object that my proposal, in focusing on the problem of white 
racism, aims to instill virtues into whites and white-dominated public institutions 
to change dominant habits of judgment. I accept the objection and believe it is a 
strength of my view. For too long whites in the U.S. have assumed that the prob-
lem of race and racism is a problem for communities of color to solve. Racial 
justice reform, however, requires that all persons take responsibility for an imper-
fect world and work to develop a basic moral illiteracy about racial realities. As it 
stands, whites disproportionately misunderstanding the nature of race, racism, and 
resultant structural inequalities.89 As a consequence, in the history of U.S. racial 
justice movements, communities of color have often stood alone against hostile 
white mobs as the sole voice of reason.
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 89 For an excellent philosophical discussion of “white” habits of judgment, see Linda M. Alcoff, The 
Future of Whiteness (Cambridge: Polity, 2015).
